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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a new definition of horizontal inequality is adopted. It is defmed 
in terrns of the distributional change within intervals of similar households, 
produced by the Tax System. We believe that this definition is better suited for 
measurement of the comparative injustice that may be caused by the Tax 
System among similar households. In particular a within-group Atkinson 
inequality index applied to one minus the tax rates of similar households is 
proposed. lt enables us to introduce this concept in a general social welfare 
framework together with efficiency and vertical equity redistribution 
considerations, where the horizontal equity and vertical redistribution are 
income~invaríant measures. It contributes to a more appropriate evaluation of 
the desirability of tax refonns aimed at achieving greater horizontal equity. 
RESUMEN 
En este papel se define la desigualdad horizontal en términos del cambio 
distributivo intragrupos que el Sistema Fiscal produce en intervalos de hogares 
similares. Creemos que ésta es una mejor deftnición para evaluar los agravios 
comparativos del Sistema Fiscal entre hogares similares. A este respecto el 
Índice de Atkinson de desigualdad intragrupos de uno menos los tipos medios 
de los hogares similares es adecuado. Una ventaja de este índice es que nos 
permite la introducción de este concepto en un marco de bienestar social junto 
con consideraciones de eficiencia y de redistribución vertical, donde la equidad 
vertical y la equidad horizontal son medidas invariantes ante cambios relativos 
de renta. El papel contribuye a una evaluación más adecuada de la deseabilidad 
de las reformas fiscales con consideraciones de equidad horizonal. 
··ACKOWLEDGMENTS: 1 aro graleful to M. Pazos and l. Rabadán. Remaining errors 
are my own. 
1. INTRODUCTlON. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, the use of a new horizontal inequality index is 
proposed, and secondly, an effort is made to reconcile the concepts of vertical and horizontal 
equity proposed within a general framework of social welfare. 
The first aim is connected with the redefmition of the traditional concept of horizontal 
inequality. We redefine horizontal inequality in terms of the distributional change in intervals 
of similar households produced by the Tax System, in line with the idea propased by 
Camarero, Herrero and Zubiri (1993). The classical view of horizontal inequality is based 
on the definition in terros of the rerank::ing produced after tax. Unlike Camarero, Herrero and 
Zubiri, we modify the concept of Cowell's distributional change [e.g., Cowell (1980) and 
(1985)] proposed by these authors, and we define it in tenns of the dispersion of one minus 
the relative changes in income within intervals of similar households, measured according 
to Atkinson's indexes. Both indexes have very similar properties l , but the index we propose 
is best suited to our mode!. 
Secondly, this horizontal inequality index will be introduced into a framework of general 
social welfare, to allow for the evaluation of the desirability of tax reforms aimed at 
achieving greater horizontal equity, in line with the idea proposed by King (1983). In 
contrast to King, however, we recommend the use of our horizontal inequality index, instead 
of a traditional reranldng indexo 
The paper is organized as follows: in sections 2 and 3 we describe and defme the concepts 
of vertical and horizontal inequality. within the proposed framework of social welfare; in 
section 4 we ¡nelude an empirical estimate of the alternative horizontal inequality indexes, 
producing similar results; in section 5 we define the concept of vertical redistribution and in 
section 6 we pIesent the conclusions. Finally, in the Appendix we provide a decomposition 
of the inequality indexes into their between and within group components. 
I Both are relative distributional change indexes defined for intervals of similar 
households, that is, they are zero-degree homogeneous indexes in the interval income 
variations and, in eonsequenee, they measure "aggregate distances" with respect to 
proportional changes in ineome. 
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2. THE CONCEPT OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY. 
Economists have generally distinguished between two types of inequaly, namely vertical and 
horizontal inequality, that provide an answer to two different kinds of questions. The first 
ane refers to the degree of dispersion existing between dissimilar households (rieh households 
with respect to their needs in contrast to poor households with respect to their needs), and 
the associated vertical redistribution indexes answer the question of to what extent the Public 
Sector corrects the vertical inequality observed between households in different brackets, In 
contrast, the second question relates to the extent to which the Public Sector grants similar 
treatment to uniform households [e.g., Feldstein (1976)]. This second question is different 
and extremely interesting smce it enables us to observe, independently of vertical 
redistribution, the degree of injustice that may be caused by the Public Sector if it treats two 
similar households belonging to one single bracket differently. 
In the relevant literature a large number of indexes, of a greater or lesser degree of 
appropriateness, have been proposed to measure each of these concepts. With regard to the 
vertical inequality indexes proposed, we may highlight the relative indexes holding tbe 
Lorenz principIe of domination of incorne distributions, such as the Theil, Gini and Atkinson 
indexes. The (vertical) redistribution indexes are constructed in terms of reductions in the 
vertical after-tax inequality indexes produced by the Tax System [e.g., Lambert (1993)]. 
The traditional horizontal inequality indexes concentrate on the measurement of the 
rerankings in income distribution produced by the Tax System, as in the case of the Atkinson 
(1980), Plotnick (1981) or King (1983) indexes, that are based on the idea that if there is 
reranking between two similar households, different fiscal treatment ensues, However, 
reranking is the consequence and not the source of horizontal inequality, and as such it could 
be considered a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for horizontal inequality. In this 
respect the distributive change indexes of intervals of similar households, such as those 
proposed by Camarero, Herrero and Zubiri, are more precise; in accordance with these 
indexes two similar households could be treated differently not only if there is reranking but 
also if their final dispersion increases after tax. They propose the use of Cowell' s index of 
relative distributional change, among similar households. In this paper we propose a similar 
index, that is, the Atkinson index applied to one minus the average tax rates. 
There is neither a simple nor a unique answer to which are the most appropriate indexes, 
since this depends on the norrnative judgernents considered. 
If all households ~ere identical in incorne, characteristics and utilities a consensus would 
be reached on fisc3i treatment: that" is, all households should pay the s~rne amouot of tax. 
However, reality is rnuch more complex, since households differ in both their income leveIs 
and their needs, and the latter depend on the family and demographic characteristic features 
of each household, In this respect, personal criteria on redistributive justice are also different, 
since each one of us has different opinions regarding the amount that each individual should 
payo There are, however, two criteria that are essentially dif.:(erent, namely vertical 
redistribution criteria, establishing the degree of aversion to vertical inequality, and 
horizontal inequality criteria, establishing the degree of aversion to comparative injustices 
.. 
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between similar households. 
However, the aboye definitions have a number of disadvantages, sorne of a practical nature 
and others of a deeper and conceptual natme. Qne of the most important practical 
disadvantages, noted by Feldstein (1976), is that the principIe of equal treatment of equals 
has little applied interest. If we consider individuals to be similar when they have exactly the 
same utility, it is possible that we may never find two identical individuals for the purpose 
of comparison. 
As a consequence, and for practical purposes, the analysis must be capable of beiog extended 
to groups of a greater or lesser size, and this factor also affects the traditional approach of 
measurement of horizontal inequality as reranking, The disadvantage arises upon extension 
of the analysis to wider groups, since the analysis is extended to individuals who are not 
genuinely similar, and who become less similar as the size of the subgroups increases. Nor 
is it clear that treatmeot of a large oumber of groups 1S the most appropriate procedure, since 
the problems generated betweeo individuals 00 the contiguous limits of different subgroups 
are multiplied. This methodology opens up sorne new conceptual questions: Which criteria 
should be followed when selecting similar groups? To what extent do the eriteria chosen 
affeet the results? And so oo. We will answer these questions below. 
Furthermore, according to Feldstein's defioition, horizontal inequality is associated with a 
Tax: System. Unlike the concept of vertical inequality, the concept of horizontal inequality 
is not valid for a distribution in itself, but is associated with a distributive change produced 
by fiscal policy, and this impIies that it must necessarily refer to the initial distribution. As 
a eonsequence, horizontal inequality is a concept that tries to measure comparative injustices 
in the status quo, that ¡s, in the initial incorne distribution before tax. It is evident, therefore, 
that the initial distribution will have a certain iniluence on the results obtained. 
Within this framework, the horizontal inequality in the income tax will not only be due to 
the treatment of the system of personal deduetions, nor to the different fiscal treatment of 
uniform incomes (those obtained following application of the equivalence scales to households 
with different family eharacteristics), nor to the initial distribution, but rather to what is a 
new factor in this approach of measurement as distributional change within the intervals of 
similar households, that is, to different taxation among households in like cireumstances. This 
new factor is important since it emphasises a possible averIap between the concepts of 
vertical redistribution and horizontal equity, even though it may influenee with opposite 
signs. There is no such overIap between these concepts in the classical approaches measuring 
horizontal ioequality by reranking of positions. 
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3. THE SOCIAL WELFARE FRAMEWORK. 
We assume an individualistic social welfare function of the after-tax adult-homogeneous 
income leve1s Y¡ and of the effective average tax rates ti of a11 the households i = 1, 2, .... 
n: 
W(Yl'Y" .. "y.;(I-t,),(I-t,), ... ,(I-t.)) (1) 
We assume this function to be syrnmetric, increasing and concave funetion in the household 
incomes Y¡ and in one minus the average tax rates (l-tJ. We define the vertica11y equally 
distributed equivalent lncome Y·v as the level of income that guarantees vertical equity. This 
is the equally distributed income leve! providing the same leve! of welfare as the after-tax 
present distribution, fo! given average tax rates: 
W(Y;,Y;, ... ,Y;;(I-t,),(l-t,), ... ,(I-t.)) = W(Yl'Y" ... 'y.;(I-t,),(I-t,), ... ,(I-t.)) (2) 
We define the vertical inequality index as the Atkinson (1970) index of Y¡ : 
(3) 
Given the concavity of W in Y¡, Y·v is no greater than YM , the aggregate mean income. Iv 
indicates the proportion af tatal income that ane would be prepared to sacrifice in arder to 
eliminate aH the existing vertical inequality. 
Let Y/ and t¡I denote the household income and the tax rate of the household i belonging to 
the interval 1 of similar househ01ds. We can express the social welfare function divided 
between the intervals 1 = 1, 2, .... , N; where ni 1S the number of households in interval 1, 
as: 
I 
11 
;W 
m(yl '''yl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1'"'' n) ... ·'(y¡ ' .. ·'yn/' ... ;«l-tl)' .. ·,(I-tnl»'· .. ,«I-tl) ... ·,(I-tn!' .. ·» (4) 
We define (lh , the equivalent tax rate guaranteeing horizontal equity in interval 1, as the 
uniform income reduction of all the households within the interval, over the initial position 
before tax, that guarantees the same level of welfare as the initial distribution of different tax 
rates, for a given initial income distribution: 
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We define the horizontal inequity index in interval 1 as the Atkinson index of 1-t¡: 
(6) 
Given the concavity of WI in (l-t\), te1h is no lower than tlM , the interval average tax rateo I lh 
denotes fue proportion of ¡ncome after tax that one would be prepared to sacrifice in order 
to eliminate all the horizontal inequality existing in this intervalo It should be noted that, 
although the average tax rates are defined with respect to ineome befare tax, I lh refers to the 
reduetion over ¡neome after tax, since: 
(7) 
We denote the aggregate horizontal equity index by ~. A between groups aggregation 
problem arises. By analogy with the vertical aggregate index, we define lh as the proportion 
of after-tax income that ane would be prepared to saerifice in arder to eliminate al1 the 
horizontal inequality existing within each intervalo That is, the uniform ineome reduction of 
all the households that guarantees the same level of welfare as that abtained if aH the 
households had the average tax rates of each group: 
nn 1 1 N N 
"·Yl' ... ,Y.;«I-t,), ... ,(I-t.,)), ... ,«I-t, ), ... ,«I-t.)) = 
1 1 N . N W(Yl' .. "y.;«I-tM)(I-Ih),···,(I-tM)(I-Ih»,···,«I-tM)(1-1h),···,(l-tM)(I-Ih))) 
(8) 
It should be noted that lb corresponds to the within groups inequality index of one minus the 
average tax rates2• lb may be expressed as: 
lIt alsa corresponds to the Atkinson within groups index of before-tax income over the 
after-tax ineome ane, which has similarities with the horizontal inequality index proposed in 
Aronson et al. (1993) and Lambert (1994) as (he Gini within groups index oí after-tax 
income, applied to groups with no before-tax inequality. 
l-l; 
1.=1---
l-lM 
(9) 
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where (h is the aggregate tax rate that would guarantee horizontal equity within eaeh group 
and tM is the aggregate average tax rateo 
Let t· be the equivalent tax rate that guarantees equal tax rates for all the population 
.... tl 1 1 N N 
'" 'Yl'""Y.;«I-t¡),,,,,(I-I.,),,,,,«I-,¡ ),,,,,«1-'.;;))) = (lO) 
W(Yl',,,,Y.;«I-1 '),,,,,(1-1 ')),,,,,«1-1 '),,,,,(1-,'))) 
and (a be the equivalent tax rate between groups that guarantees a level of welfare equal to 
that which would be obtained if all the households had the average tax rates of each group 
ntl 1 1 N N 
'" 'Yl'""Y.;«I-'M)(I-I.),,,,,(I-'M)(I-I.)),,,,,«I-'M)(I-I.),,,,,«I-'M )(1-1,))) = (11) 
W(Yl'""Y.;«I-t;)(l-I.),,,,,(l-,;)(I-I.)),,,,,«I-,;)(I-I.),,,,,(I-t;)(I-I,))) 
Then lh may be expressed as': 
1=1_ 1-" . , 
l-lB 
(12) 
Strictly speaking the aggregate iodex lh depends 00 the ioeome distribution, tax rates and 
degree of concavity of the welfare function with respect to (l-~), whieh as we shall see 
defines within groups horizontal inequality aversion and in tum the between groups horizontal 
inequality aversion ,~ór, if preferred, the kind of between groups aggregaüon of horizontal 
inequality). ~ 
3 Let 1 be the Atkinson global inequality index of one minus the average tax rates in 
al1 the intervals. Then we can break down: 1 - 1 = (l-IJ(l-IB), where lB is the between 
groups Atkinson index calcu1ated as if all the households had the average tax group rate (that 
is, the amouot of ioeome that we would sacrifice in arder to pr~vent between groups 
inequality ) and lh i5 the within groups Atkinson index (that is, the ambunt of ineome that we 
would sacrifice in order to prevent within each group inequality). 
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If we assume that W(.) is homothetic in Y and (1-t), then Iv and Ih are invariant to 
proportional changes in income and in one minus the average tax rates within each intervalo 
In this case: 
W=Y,,(1-/,)(I-I.) (13) 
The advantage of an expression of welfare such as (13) is that it allows us to inelude, in an 
operative marmer, the effects of efficiency (through Y ~ as well as the effects of vertical and 
horizontal inequality separately (through Iv and IJ. 
In addition, if we assume that W(.) is additively separable into households4 
and that Y¡ and (1-t.) are independenf, 
W=L;ol V(Y¡)+L;o¡H(I-'¡) 
then homotheticity implies 
yl-e 
V(l')=-, 
1-0 
V(l')=LnY, 
R(I-t)= (l-t)l-y, 
I-y 
e=1 
y.l 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
4 This implies that re1ative social valuation of the ineorne or tax rates between two 
households does not depend on the other households. 
5 This irnplies that relative social valuation of the households' income does llot depend 
on their tax rates, and vice versa. 
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R(I-t)=Ln(I-t), y=1 (19) 
and the vertical equity index may be expressed as follows: 
(20) 
(21) 
where E is the degree of aversion to vertical inequality, which is greater than zero if we 
require concavity. 
In this case, the aggregate horizontal equity index can be expressed as follows: 
where: 
and 
where: 
, 
1-11t ",[..!.L%l nr[l-I;1 1- Y] I:y, 
n 
1.--# ¡ 1-1, =exp[ -l..¡.,n¡Ln[I-I,ll, 
n 
pI 
pI 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
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1 1 ..-111 l-t¡ 
l-lh =exp[ -l....¡=lLn[--, ]], 
nI l-tM 
y=1 (25) 
where ')' i5 the degree of aversion to horizontal inequality, which ís greater than zero for 
concavity. 
It would enter into the SWF in equation (13), defined for € and 'Y parameters of aversion to 
vertical and horizontal inequality. We can also aggregate the two inequality indexes into ene 
total inequality index In with frxed values for € and 7: 
(26) 
where It would be the proportion of ineorne after tax that one would be prepared to sacrifice 
in order to eliminate all the existing vertieal and horizontal inequity. In the Appendix we 
provide a decomposition of the inequality indexes into population subgroups. 
4. HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY IN THE SPANISH PERSONAL INCOME TAX. 
We use the data base of the Spanish Personal Income Tax "expanded panel". consisting in 
simple annual random samples of individual Income Tax returns for the years 1982 to 1990. 
In 1988 and subsequent years the separate tax returos of married couples are added together 
to constitute one single item. 
A serious difficulty arising in the ana1ysis of horizontal inequality is that of the correet 
determination of adult-equivalent income. We use the tax base as the monetary household 
income, which we divide by the following equivalence scale, which is clase to that proposed 
by ,he OECD': 
(27) 
in which Al is one in those cases in which there is a spouse and zero in cases in which there 
is no spouse. A2 is equal to the number of children and A3 is equal to the number of 
ascendant relatives in the household earning no income. 
As a tax variable, we have made use of the net tax liability recorded in the tax returos. Since 
sorne tax returos have negative tax bases, these have been modified to one peseta following 
6 The OECD scale adopts the value of one for the flIst adult in the household. plus 0.7 
for the second adult, plus 0.5 for each child (under 14 years of age) in the household. 
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verification that this change, or elimination of these iteros, did not produce any significant 
differences in the indexes. Tbis is done in order to eliminate non-positive arguments froro 
the 10garithms, while keeping at the same time the maximum possible amount of data and 
criteria uniformity for a11 the indexes. 
Table 1 shows the indexes computed with the rates of change from the previous period; see 
Pazos, Rabadán and Salas (1994). Graph 1 shows the evolution of all tbe indexes. 
The first two indexes are reranldng indexes: the King's Scaled Order Statistics (1983) and 
the Atkinson's (1980) and Plotnick's (1981) Preordered Inequality Index. The 1ast two 
indexes are aggregate relative distributional change indexes computed for similar households, 
such as the Camarero et al. (1993) proposal of use of the Cowell index (1985) or our 
proposed indexo In these cases intervals of similar households are taken as centiles of adult-
equivalent income levels. 
lt can be noticed that a11 the computed indexes show similar variations from one year to the 
next. Thus all the indexes rise between 1984 and 1988, and then fall again in 1990. We can 
say that 1988 is the year in which there is the greatest "maltreatment" with regard to the 
horizontal behaviour of taxation, since a11 the indexes refleet this trend. In 1990 horizontal 
inequality fen again, almost to the 1986 levels. 
This evolution can be observed both in the indexes that only measure the horizontal inequity 
implied by reranking (the King and Plotniek indexes) as well as in the distributional change 
of similar households indexes. 
Another important result is that the proposed index offers, as expeeted, a certain degree of 
sensitivity, even though stable, to the choice of intervals of similar income levels, whieh 
decreases as the number of intervals increases. In this case we have chosen to organize these 
intervals according to different income quantiles, finally opting in favour of eentiles. Table 
2 shows the variations in the proposed distributional change index according to the change 
in the number of intervals. These intervals are the 10th, 100th and 1000th quantiles, 
respectively. 
In comparison with the results of Pazos et al. (1994), in which a linear additive aggregation 
in population is used, different from that of the equations (22) and (24) and more in tine with 
that of Camarero et al., the results show hUle variation. 
5. i THE VER"r~AL REDlSTRlBUTION INDEX. 
We define the concept of vertical redistribution as the effect of taxation on social welfare 
by means of the relative reduction in vertical inequality. Given social welfare before tax: ' 
W=Y,,(l-I) (28) 
the tax system produces the following effect on social welfare: 
11 
(29) 
The relative variation in welfare may be expressed as fo11ows: 
áW áYM á(l-l) 1, 
--=--+-----
W YM (1-1) W 
(30) 
The three components into which the effect on welfare can be divided are: the rate of change 
in average income (the contribution to efficieney), the rate of change in vertical equity (the 
degree of vertical redistribution of the tax) and, finally, the rate of reduction in welfare due 
to the horizontal inequity of the system. With a minor transformation, the vertical 
redistribution index of the tax may be expressed as a relative reduction in the vertical 
inequality index 7 : 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
1 -¡I RV=~ (1-1) 
(31) 
In tbis paper a new horizontal inequality index has been derived and, in addition, we have 
reconciled the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity proposed within a general framework 
of social welfare. 
The first aim is related to the redefinition of horizontal inequality in terros of the 
distributional change within intervals of similar households, produced by the Tax System, 
in line with the idea proposed by Camarero, Herrero and Zubiri (1993) and in contrast with 
the classical indexes based upon the reranking effects. Our index is defined in terms of the 
dispersion of one minus the relative variations in ineome in intervals of similar households, 
measured according to the Atkinson indexes, which best suits our model of general social 
welfare and which, in turo, allows for evaluation of the desirability of tax reforms aimed at 
achieving greater horizontal equity. 
We believe that our index 1S better suited for the observation of the degree of injustice that 
may be caused by the Publie Sector if it treats similar households differently. Empírica! 
7 The c1assical absolute inequality reduction indexes IR! = Iv - Iv' could also be 
proposed, even though their interpretation would be somewhat different since they would 
measure the increase in absolute welfare. 
il 
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APPENDIX. 
DECOMPosmON OF VERTICAL INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION BY 
POPULATION SUBGROUPS: WITHIN AND BETWEEN GROUPS. 
We can decompose the vertical inequality index Iv into K population subgroups, and into a 
between groups index 4,B and a within groups index Iv,w, defined as follows: 
(32) 
where Y*v,B 15 the uniforrnly distributed equivalent ineorne level providing the utility level 
equa! to that which would be attained if all the individuals had the mean income of each 
group. It would therefore be the equivalent ineorne level that would guarantee equality of the 
groups (between groups). In consequence, 1..,B would indicate the proportion of income that 
we would be prepared to sacrifice to eliminate all inequality between groups. Given the faet 
that W is concave in Y¡, Y*V,B 15 less than YM and, therefore, Iv,8 i5 positive. Furthermore, 
the within groups index is defined as follows: 
y' 
1 -1-~ 
v,Ir y 
M 
(33) 
where y* v.w is the uniforrnly distributed equivalent income level that would guarantee 
equality within each group (within groups). Then, Iv,w would indicate the proportion of 
income that we would be prepared to sacrifice for elimination of all inequality within groups. 
Given that W is concave in Y¡, I",w is lower than the average of the population-weighted 
internal group indexes. 
I".w ean be expressed in terms of the equivalent ineome that guarantees total vertical equality 
and that whieh only guarantees equality between groups: 
y' 
1 =1--' v,w .. 
Y, .. 
In this case we obtain the following decomposition: 
(34) 
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(I-I,l=(I-I,,sl(I-I,,w) (35) 
If we assume that W(.) i5 homothetic in Y, then Iy.B and Iv,w are invariant to proportional 
changes in ineome. In this case: 
W=Y,.(I-I,,sl(I-I,,w)(I-I,) (36) 
The advantage of an expression of welfare such as (36) is that it allows us to inelude, in an 
operative manner, the effects oí efflciency, the effects of vertical inequality both within and 
between groups, and the effects of horizontal inequality separately. 
In addition, if we assume that W(.) i8 additively separable into individuals and that Y¡ and 
(1-t;) are independent, theo the vertical equity index can be expressed in terms of the 
individual indexes of each subgroup J, if é is greater than zero and different from ane, as 
follows: 
(37) 
where IJ v is the vertical inequality index of subgroup J, equal to: 
(38) 
If f is equal to ane: 
I"K J 1-1 w=exp[-L..Joln).n[I-I,ll 
" n 
(39) 
where: 
(40) 
:, 
15 
Similarly, vertical redistribution can be subdivided into the effects of contribution within and 
between groups: 
1 -1' 1 -1' RV"" v,B v,B + v,w v,W 
(1-1, .. ) (1-1"w) !~ / 
,. 
o 
. , 
\ \ 
(41) 
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TABLE 1 
EVOLUTION OF A NUMBER OF HORIZONTAL lNEOUAUTY INDEXES (x 1000) 
1982 - 1990. 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
King 1. 23,015 25,871 35,052 38,996 35,751 
(%) (12.41) (35.49) (11.25) (-8.32) 
Plotniek 1. 1,070 1,198 2,124 2,875 2,111 
(%) (11.96) (77.30) (35.36) (-26.57) 
Camarero 0,4622 0,5297 1,0258 1,6685 1,1018 
et al. 1. 
(%) (14.60) (93.66) (62.65) (-33.96) 
Ih 0,4371 0,5028 1,0061 1,5786 1,1226 
(% ) (15.01) (100.02) (56.81) (-28.84) 
Size of 123599 132693 165069 181390 210457 
sample 
Note: All indexes are multiplied by 1000. Camarero et al 1. is evaluated for a= 1 and lh 
for 'Y = 1 and both for centiles of adult-homogeneous income. 
TABI.E 2 
l. INDEXES (x 100m FOR D1FFERENT PARTITIONS. 
QUANTILES 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
10 0.4906 0.5818 1.0972 1.7102 1.2787 
100 0.4371 0.5028 1.0061 1.5786 1.1226 
1000 0.4226 0.4802 0.9818 1.5551 1.0941 
(1) 
W 
x 
W 
o 
Z 
>-
1-
.,.-...J 
:r:« 
0..:::> 
«o 
a: W CJZ 
...J 
~ 
Z 
o 
N 
a: 
O 
:r: 
\ 
'" 
o 
O) 
O) 
~ 
ro 
ro 
O) 
~ 
ID 
ro 
O) 
~ 
'" ro 
00) 
~ 
-Q) 
o 
~ 
Q) 
~ 
ro 
E 
ro 
Ü 
+ 
-' 
-"" o 
e 
-O 
o. 
t 
-' 
Ol 
e 
:.:: 
¡ 
9301 
9302 
9303 
9304 
9305 
9306 
9307 
9308 
SERIE DE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO DEL [CAE 
"Análisis del comportamiento de las cotizaciones reales en la Bolsa 
de Madrid bajo la hipótesis de eficiencia". Rafael Flores de 
Frutos. Diciembre 1992. (Aceptado para publicar en Estadística Española) 
"Sobre la estimaci6n de primas por plazo dentro de la estructura 
temporal de tipos de interés ". Rafael Flores de Frutos. Diciembre 
1992. 
"Cambios de estructuras de gasto y de consumo en el cálculo del 
¡pe". Antonio Abadía. Febrero 1993. (Publicado en Reyista de Economía 
Aplicada, Vol.1, N°l) 
"Tax Ana/ysis in a Limit Pricing Model". Félix Marcos. Febrero 
1993. 
"El tipo de cambio propio: reformulación del concepto y 
estimación para el caso español". José de Hevia Payá. Junio 1993. 
(Publicado en Revista Española de Economía, Vo1.11, N°t, 1994) 
"Price Volatility Under Alternative Monetary Instruments". Alfonso 
Novales. Abril 1992. 
"Teorías del tipo de cambio: una panorámica ". Osear Bajo Rubio 
y Simón Sosvilla Rivera. Junio1993. (Publicado en Revista de Economía 
Aplicada, Vol.1, N°2). 
"Testing Iheories of Economic Fluctuations and Growth in Early 
Development (!he Case of the Chesapeake Tobacco Economy)". 
Rafael Flores de Frutos y Alfredo M. Pereira. Diciembre 1992. 
9309 
9310 
9311 
9312 
9313 
9314 
9315 
9316 
9317 
"Maastricht Convergence Conditions: A Lower Bound for 
Inflation?". Jorge Blázquez y Miguel Sebastián. Marzo 1992. 
"Recursive Identijication, Estimation and Forecasting of 
Nonstationary Economic Time Series with Applications to GNP 
Intemational Data". A. García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A. Novales y 
P.C. Young. Marzo 1993. (De próxima aparición en un volumen de homenaje 
a A. Zellner) 
"General Dynamics in Overlapping Generations Models". Carmen 
Carrera y Manuel Morán. Enero 1993. (Aceptado para publicar en Journa! 
oí Economic Dynamics and CQntroO 
"Further Evidence on Forecasting International GNP Growth Rates 
Using Unobserved Components Transfer Function Models". A. 
García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A. Novales y P.C. Young. Septiembre 
1993. 
"Public Capital and Aggregate Growth in the United States: Is 
Public Capital Productive?". Rafael Flores de Frutos y Alfredo M. 
Pereira. Julio 1993. 
"Central Bank Structure and Monetary Policy Uncertainty". José 
1. García de Paso. Abril 1993. 
"Monftary Policy with Private Information: A Role for Monetary 
Targ.ets ". José 1. García de Paso. Julio 1993 . 
• . :;,
"Exact Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stationary Vector ARMA 
Models". José Alberto Mauricio. Julio 1993. (Aceptado para publicar en 
Journal of the American StatistjcaJ ASSQciatjQP) 
"The Exact Likelihood Function of a Vector A~A Model". José 
Alberto Mauricio. Julio 1993. j 
9318 
9401 
9402 
9403 
9404 
9405 
9406 
9407 
9408 
"Business Telephone Traffic Demand in Spain: 1980-1991, An 
Econometric Approach", Teodosio Pérez Amara( Fran(fisco 
Alvarez González y Bernardo Moreno Jiméuez. Septiembre 1993. 
(Aceptado para publicación en Infonnation Economics and Policy) 
"Contrastes de momentos y de la matriz de información". Teodosio 
Pérez Amaral. Junio 1994. (Publicado en Cuadernos Económicos del ICE,N° 
55, 1993/3) 
"A Partisan Explanation of Political Monetary Cycles". José 1. 
García de Paso. Junio 1994. 
"Estadísticos para la detección de observaciones anómalas en 
modelos de elección binaria: una aplicación con datos reales". 
Gregorio R. Serrano. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para publicar en Estadística 
Española> 
"Effects of Public Investment in Infraestructure on the Spanish 
Economy". Rafael Flores de Frutos, Mercedes Gracia Díez y 
Teodosio Pérez Amaral. Junio 1994. 
"Observaciones anómalas en modelos de elección binaria". 
Mercedes Gracia y Gregorio R. Serrano. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para 
publicar en Estadística Española) 
"Permanent Components in Seasonal Variables". Rafael Flores y 
Alfonso Novales. Junio 1994. 
"Monq Demand Instability and the Peiformance of the Monetary 
Model of Exchange Rates". Rodrigo Peruga. Junio 1994. 
"Una nota sobre la estimación eficiente de modelos con parámetros 
cambiantes ". Sonia Sotoca. Junio 1994. 
9409 "Distribución de la renta y redistribución a través del IRPF en 
España". Rafael Salas. Junio 1994. 
9410 "Trade Balances: Do Exchange Rates Matter?". Rodrigo Peruga. 
Junio 1994. 
9411 "A Retrial System with Constant Attempts". Mercedes Vázquez. 
Octubre 1994. 
9412 "A Retrial Model at Nonstationary Regime". Mercedes Váquez. 
Octubre 1994. 
9413 "Equívocos y singularidades en el sistema financiero español". 
Jaime Terceiro Lomba. Noviembre 1994. 
9414 "On Univariate Forecasting Comparisons: The Case ofthe Spanish 
Automobile Industry ". A. García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A. S. Martín-
Arroyo y P.C. Young. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para publicar en ¡OUIna! of 
Forecasting) 
9415 "Horizontal and Vertical Inequality in a Social Welfare 
Framework". Rafael Salas. Noviembre 1994. 
9416 "A Model of Appointing Governors to the Central Bank". José I. 
García de Paso. Octubre 1994. 
j 
,1 
9417 "CaJital público y restricción presupuestaria gubernamental". 
Jorge Blázquez y Miguel Sebastián. Diciembre 1994. 
9418 "Efectos dinámicos de perturbaciones de demanda y oferta en la 
economía española", Esther Fernández Casillas, José Luis 
Fernández Serrano, Baltasar Manzano Gonz¡ílez y Jesús Ruiz 
Andújar. Diciembre 1994.· 
